Local Government: Recent Developments in Local Government Law in Illinois by Vitullo, Vincent F.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 22 
Issue 1 Fall 1972 Article 7 
Local Government: Recent Developments in Local Government 
Law in Illinois 
Vincent F. Vitullo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Vincent F. Vitullo, Local Government: Recent Developments in Local Government Law in Illinois, 22 DePaul 
L. Rev. 85 (1972) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol22/iss1/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW IN ILLINOIS
VINCENT F. VITULLO*
HERE COULD be no time more appropriate than the present to
initiate an annual survey of local government law in Illinois.
Article VII, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 has
recently revolutionized local government law in this state by intro-
ducing the concept of "home rule" into Illinois jurisprudence. It is
the purpose of this survey to outline the principle features of this
revolution.
Prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1970, Illinois law fol-
lowed the traditional view that all local governments are "creatures"
of the state and totally dependent upon the state legislature as a
source of power to act.' This doctrine is usually referred to as Dil-
lon's Rule because it was first clearly enunciated by Judge Dillon in
his classic treatise on municipal corporations.2 In an often-cited case,
the Illinois Supreme Court applied Dillon's Rule in the follow-
ing language:
The city must have an express grant of authority from the General Assembly to en-
act the ordinances unless the power is necessarily implied in or incidental to
power or powers expressly conferred.3
Furthermore, a necessary corollary to Dillon's Rule was the propo-
sition that legislative grants of authority to local governments must be
strictly construed. As one decision put it: "Statutes conferring
powers on municipal corporations are strictly construed and any fair
* Professor of Law, DePaul University; J.D., Loyola University; LL.M., Yale
University.
1. SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 1603
(1972) [hereinafter cited as 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS].
2. 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORAnONs 448 (5th ed., 1911).
3. Ives v. City of Chicago, 30 111. 2d 582, 584, 198 N.E.2d 518, 519 (1964).
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or reasonable doubt that an asserted power exists is resolved against
the municipality." 4
For a broad variety of reasons, the draftsmen of the Illinois Con-
stitution of 1970 decided to limit the concept of legislative supremacy
in local government law in favor of home rule for at least some lo-
cal government units.5 This decision was implemented principally
by the rather complex provisions of article VII, section 6 of the new
constitution. A close reading of that section is necessary to un-
derstand the anatomy of home rule in Illinois.
At the outset it should be noted that article VII confers home
rule status automatically on all municipalities with a population of
25,000 or more and upon any county which has "a chief executive
officer elected by the electors of the county."" However, municipali-
ties of less than 25,000 may elect by referendum to become home
rule units.7 Furthermore, any home rule unit may elect by refer-
endum "not to be a home rule unit."'8
Article VII, section 6(a) reverses Dillon's Rule by making a di-
rect constitutional grant of governmental power to home rule units
in extremely broad language:
(a) Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power
and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but
not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety,
morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.9
This language was consciously intended by the draftsmen to confer
upon home rule units ". . . the broadest possible range of powers to
deal with the problems facing them . . .,,'
In spite of the breadth of the powers conferred, the Report of the
Local Government Committee of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional
Convention makes it clear that the grant of powers to home rule units
is not unlimited:
4. City of Chicago v. Ingersoll Steel and Disk Division, 371 Ill. 2d 183, 186,
20 N.E.2d 287, 288 (1939).
5. 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS at 1605-11.
6. ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(a).
7. ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(a). (At the present time, only Cook County
has such a chief executive.)
8. ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(b).
9. ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(a).
10. 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDNGS at 1619.
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It is clear, however, that the powers of home-rule units relate to their own problems,
not to those of the state or nation. Their powers should not extend to such mat-
ters as divorce, real property law, trusts, contracts, etc. . . . Thus, the proposed
grant of powers to local governments extends only to matters 'pertaining to their
government and affairs'. 11
The Local Government Committee Report also contains illustrative
examples of local governmental action which, in the committee's
opinion, would not fall within the range of home rule powers. For
example, the committee felt that the home rule unit could not, by its
own authority, regulate interest rates on loans, regulate local tele-
phone rates, or establish separate pension funds for policemen and
firemen.'12
Thus, the main issue presented by the new home rule provisions
is the precise scope of authority granted by article VII, section 6(a).
The constitutional history of section 6(a) is anything but clear.
To obscure matters further, the operative language of section 6(a)
has no exact duplicate in the law of other states. Apparently this
lack of similarity with the law of other states was a matter of conscious
choice by the draftsmen.13 As a consequence, judicial decisions
from other jurisdictions are not likely to prove very helpful in in-
terpreting the new home rule provisions of Illinois.
Although the language of section 6(a) was intended to include
as extensive a range of governmental powers as possible, the drafts-
men felt it necessary to mention specifically the powers to tax, to in-
cur debt, to regulate and to license so as to protect these essential
governmental powers from limitation or erosion by judicial in-
terpretation. 4
Perhaps the most important of these specific powers is the power to
tax. Without adequate funding, a home rule unit would find it dif-
ficult or impossible to exercise its other powers. Section 6(a) con-
fers a general power to tax limited only by the provisions of section
6(e)(2) which forbid a home rule unit ". . . to license for reve-
nue or impose taxes upon or measured by income or earnings or upon
occupations" unless authorized by the General Assembly.' 5 The pur-
11. Id. at 1621.
12. Id. at 1652.
13. Id. at 1621.
14. Id. at 1622-27.
15. ILL. CONST., art. Vii, § 6(e)(2).
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pose of these specific prohibitions is to protect the income tax as a
revenue base for the state and to prevent the imposition of "income
taxes" in the form of occupation taxes or licensing for revenue. 16 Ap-
parently, all other forms of taxation are available to home rule units.
At the time of this writing, S. Bloom, Inc. v. Marshall Kor-
shak" remains the only decision by the Illinois Supreme Court in-
terpreting the home rule provision of the new Illinois constitution. In
that case, Chicago's "cigarette tax" was upheld. The court rejected
the claim (among others) that the levy was an occupation tax on
either the retailer or the wholesaler. The court pointed out that the
tax was levied on the consumer and was, therefore, the equivalent
of a sales tax. Of prime importance was the court's observation that
the legal incidence of a tax is not determined by its economic im-
pact, but rather by the express intent of the law levying the tax. Thus,
the validity of a home rule tax is largely a matter of legislative form.
It should be noted that there is no constitutional limit on the rate
of home rule taxation. However, the General Assembly does retain
the power to deny or limit home rule taxing powers by a three-fifths
vote of all those elected to both houses. 18 Whether or not this power
can serve as an effective brake on possible excesses in home rule tax-
ation remains to be seen.
The General Assembly retains a higher degree of control over in-
debtedness. The General Assembly may limit by law the amount of
debt incurred by a home rule county. 9 In the case of munici-
palities, the General Assembly may limit debt incurred only by a
three-fifths majority of both houses except for debt to be repaid out
of ad valorem property tax receipts. In the latter case, the Gen-
eral Assembly r-\, limit the amount of debt or require a referendum
by law only in excess of certain percentages of assessed evaluation of
taxable property as provided in subsection 6(k).20
Of particular importance are the provisions of subsection 6(1):
16. 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS at 1671-72.
17. 52 I11. 2d 56, 284 N.E.2d 257 (1972).
18. ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(g).
19. ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(j).
20. ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(k). In addition, it should be noted that all
indebtedness to be repaid out of ad valorem property tax receipts must be repaid
in 40 years. ILL. CONST,, art. VII, sec. 6(d).
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The General Assembly may not deny or limit the power of home rule
units (1) to make local improvements by special assessment and to exercise this
power jointly with other counties and municipalities, and other classes of units of
local government having that power on the effective date of this Constitution unless
that power is subsequently denied by law to any such other units of local govern-
ment or (2) to levy or impose additional taxes upon areas within their boundaries
in the manner provided by law for the provision of special services to those areas
and for the payment of debt incurred in order to provide those special services.
2 1
Paradoxically enough, the highest degree of constitutional protection
is granted to special assessments and to so-called "additional taxes"
to provide "special services." This introduces the concept of "dif-
ferential taxation" into Illinois local government law for the first
time.2  The express purpose of the Local Government Committee in
proposing the differential taxation provision was to permit home
rule units to provide "special services" to limited areas within their
boundaries without taxing the entire population for those services.23
Laudatory as this purpose may be, the language of this section
contains serious difficulties. First of all, the term "special services"
is not defined. Secondly, the initial prohibition against legislative
interference ("The General Assembly may not limit or deny the
power to . . . levy additional taxes . . .") is diluted by the phrase
"in the manner provided by law" contained in subsection 6(l)(2).
This last phrase creates the possibility that the General Assembly
"by law" can provide some type of limitation in the "manner" of
levying such taxes. But what that limitation may be can be de-
termined only by future litigation.
The prohibition against licensing for revenue found in subsection
6(d)24 should not be interpreted as a ban against all licensing fees.
It was the intention of the draftsmen to codify pre-existing Illinois
law which permitted licensing fees which were "reasonably related"
to the cost of regulation.23 Of course, any such license for which a
fee is charged must serve a legitimate regulatory purpose.
Another major home rule power is that conferred by subsection
6(f) which authorizes a home rule unit "... subject to approval by
21. ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(1).
22. 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS at 1662.
23. Id.
24. ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(d).
25. 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS at 1675.
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referendum to adopt, alter, or repeal a form of government provided
by law . ",26 Subsection 6(f) further provides " . . . [a] home
rule municipality shall have the power to provide for its officers,
their manner of selection and terms of office only as approved by ref-
erendum or as otherwise authorized by law."'2 7  The general inten-
tion of the draftsmen appears to have been to permit home rule mu-
nicipalities to select any of the general forms of municipal govern-
ment provided in the Illinois Municipal Code. 28  However, the in-
clusion of the term "alter" in subsection 6(f) creates a basic am-
biguity. It suggests that a home rule municipality, by referendum
or otherwise, might be able to make significant alterations in the
structure of its form of government not specifically provided for in
the Municipal Code. Furthermore, the authority to provide for its of-
ficers, their manners of selection and terms of office, suggests the
possibility of major alterations in the offices and official powers set
forth for municipal officers in the Illinois Municipal Code. In addi-
tion, it would seem safe to assume that a home rule unit could make
whatever changes it deemed advisable in those matters which could be
classified as "internal procedure" as contrasted with those matters
relating to the form of government or the officers of the unit. 9 Again,
only future litigation can clarify these basic ambiguities.
In subsections 6(d) and 6(e),8° the new constitution codifies the
right of home rule units to enforce obedience to their legislative
directive by the imposition of criminal sanctions. Subsections 6(d)
(2) denies to home rule units the power "to define and provide for
the punishment of a felony." Subsection 6(e)(1) provides: "A
home rule unit has only the power that the General Assembly may
provide by law . . . to punish by imprisonment for more than 6
months. . . ." The report of the Local Government Committee
makes it clear that the intention of the draftsmen was to codify on the
constitutional level the existing ability of counties and municipalities
26. ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(f).
27. Id.
28. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 3-11-1 to § 3-11-30; § 4-1-1 to § 4-10-1;
§ 5-1-1 to § 5-6; § 6-1-1 to § 6-5-1 (1971).
29. Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part I): Powers and
Limitations, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 137, 146-52 (1972).
30. ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(d) and 6(e).
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to enforce their ordinances by the use of criminal sanctions."' How-
ever, it should be noted that strong doubts have been expressed as to
whether or not a separate system of law enforcement on the muni-
cipal level may violate federal constitutional principles.8 2
Given the broad range of regulatory powers granted by subsection
6(a), it is obviously possible for many conflicts to arise between state
regulatory policy and the regulatory policies of the various home
rule units in the state. Subsections 6(g), 6(h) and 6(i) were
adopted to cope with this problem. 8 Subsection 6(g) permits the
legislature to limit or deny any home rule power, including the power
to tax "by a vote of three-fifths of the members of each house." Sub-
section 6(h), on the other hand, permits the General Assembly to
"provide specifically by law for the exclusive exercise of the State of
any power or function by a home rule unit. . . ." The report of
the Local Government Committee makes it clear that the provisions
of subsection 6(g) were intended to apply only to those instances
in which the General Assembly was simply creating a legal vacuum
by prohibiting home rule legislation without prohibiting regulation
at the state level. 4 In contrast, subsection 6(h) was intended to cover
those situations in which the state was itself operating in the field.85
Subsection 6(i) was intended merely to make it clear that where the
General Assembly so specified local regulation and state regulation
in the same area could exist concurrently.
Thus, subsections 6(g), 6(h) and 6(i) provide the mechanism
whereby the legislature might intervene in matters "pertaining to their
government and affairs" when over-riding state policy should make
such intervention necessary. It should be noted, however, that the
effect of these sections is to eliminate the possibility of "implied
pre-emption" as a doctrine limiting the role of home rule action.8 6
Section 6(h) requires that the General Assembly "specifically" pro-
vide for the exclusive exercise of a function or power.
31. 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS at 1650-51.
32. Comment, Defending an Illinois Proceeding for Violation of a Municipal
Ordinance: The Worst of All Possible Worlds, 1 LOYOLA L.J. 86 (1970).
33. ILL. CONST., art. VII, §§ 6(g), 6(h), 6(i).
34. 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS at 1641-42.
35. Id. at 1642-45.
36. Id. at 1643.
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As can be seen, the critical issue that arises out of the provisions
of subsections 6(g), 6(h) and 6(i) is the question of the size of
the majority necessary for any legislative action limiting home
rule functions. Assuming that a 60 percent majority of those elected
to both houses is available, the General Assembly may deny or limit
any home rule function except for those provided in subsection 6 (1).
If, however, only a simple majority can be mustered in favor of leg-
islative intervention, only the provisions of 6(h) and 6(i) are appli-
cable. However, to invoke the provisions of 6(h) and 6(i), the
state must itself "exercise the power or perform the function." Thus,
it becomes critical to determine when the state is actually exercising
the power or performing the function as contrasted with those situa-
tions in which the state is operating merely to limit or deny home rule
powers. For example, can the provisions of section 6(h) be in-
voked if the legislature should pass by a simple majority a statute
setting forth a particular procedure to be followed by all local zon-
ing boards? To hold that the state is "performing a function" by
enacting such a statute would make it possible for the General Assem-
bly to interfere by a simple majority in the exercise of all home rule
powers. Consequently, it would appear that such a statute would
have to be enacted by a 60 percent majority of both houses to be
effective against home rule units. Whatever the answer to this prob-
lem should turn out to be, the important point is that the capacity
of the legislature to act under these circumstances will be determined
by the definition of the term "the exclusive exercise of the state of
any power or function." As is so often the case under the new
constitution, the definition of this all important phrase will have to
await future litigation.
In summary, it would appear that, although the grant of home rule
powers in subsection 6(a) is indeed broad, it may be limited in two
ways. First, the legislature might interfere pursuant to subsections
6(g), 6(h) and 6(i). Secondly, the grant of power in 6(a) might be lim-
ited by judicial construction of the phrase "pertaining to its govern-
ment and affairs." These two possibilities raise the question of the
respective role of the judiciary and the legislature in controlling the
use of home rule power.
It has been suggested elsewhere that the role of the judiciary in
controlling the possible abuse of home rule power should be a limited
[Vol. XXII: 85
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
one.37 It is argued that the entire structure of the home rule arti-
cle in the new constitution would seem to place the primary bur-
den of controlling the abuse of home rule power on the legislature.
However, it is obvious that the draftsmen of the home rule article
recognized that the grant of power in subsection 6(a) could not be
considered unlimited. Furthermore, it is obvious that no legislature
can possibly foresee all of the conflicts between state policy on one
hand and a multitude of home rule policies on the other hand. It
might not be possible for the legislature to react politically in time
to avoid considerable abuse or injustice by the unforeseen impact of
innumerable home rule regulations. Although a discussion of all
of the issues involved in this question are beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle, the role of the judiciary in interpreting the various provisions
of section 6 is a critical one and obviously can be determined only
by future litigation. For the time being, all we can do is point out
that the Constitutional Convention mandated in section 6(m) that
the "powers and functions of home rule units shall be construed
liberally." '
One of the most important additions to the powers of local gov-
ernments to be found in the new constitution is in section 10 of the
local government article:
Section 10. INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION
(a) Units of local government and school districts may contract or otherwise as-
sociate among themselves, with the State, with other states and their units of local
government and school districts, and with the United States to obtain or share
services and to exercise, combine, or transfer any power or function, in any man-
ner not prohibited by law or by ordinance. Units of local government and school
districts may contract and otherwise associate with individuals, associations, and
corporations in any manner not prohibited by law or by ordinance. Participating
units of government may use their credit, revenues, and other resources to pay
costs and to service debt related to intergovernmental activities.
(b) Officers and employees of units of local government and school districts may
participate in intergovernmental activities authorized by their units of government
without relinquishing their offices or positions.
(c) The State shall encourage intergovernmental cooperation and use its techni-
cal and financial resources to assist intergovernmental activities.3 9
37. Baum, supra note 29, at 152-57.
38. ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(m).
39. ILL. CONsT., art. VII, § 10.
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Section 10 was intended to provide a possible solution to problems
which extend beyond the limited boundaries of local governmental
units. It is the only section in the new constitution which addresses
itself to the so-called metropolitan area problems. 0  In effect,
section 10 removes any legal objection to the delegation of govern-
mental powers on the local government level.
It should be noted that section 10 applies to all governmental
units. Although it is not confined to home rule units, it can be as-
sumed that home rule units because of their wider scope of possible
activities will make wider use of section 10 than will non-home rule
units. In addition, it should be noted that these powers can be
curtailed by the legislature by a simple majority.
Unfortunately, the Illinois Constitution of 1970 contains little pro-
vision for resolving conflicts between local governmental units."' Con-
sequently, Illinois law remains in the somewhat confusing position
that it has traditionally maintained on this question. For example,
in City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary District4 2 the Illinois
Supreme Court has recently held that a sanitary district may locate
a sewage processing facility within the boundaries of a city without
any regard to that city's zoning laws. Following the lead of the Il-
linois Supreme Court, an Illinois appellate court has also recently
held that a city may acquire and operate a garbage dump in an un-
incorporated area of a county without regard to that county's zon-
ing regulations.43  In both of these cases, the rationale leaned heavily
on the fact that the legislature had granted to the Chicago Metropolitan
Sanitary District and to the City of Rockford the power of emi-
nent domain to acquire property for' the parti, ular use which was
the subject of the complaint. Apparently, the granting of eminent
domain to accomplish a particular use or function immunizes that
function from any restriction or control by any other local govern-
mental units. Thus, there remains no mechanism for resolving the
conflicting interests involved in cases such as these. We can assume
40. 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGs at 1747-52.
41. The one exception to this generalization is the limited provision in art.
VII, § 6(c) resolving conflicts between home rule counties and municipalities
located within their borders.
42. 48 Ill. 2d 11, 268 N.E.2d 428 (1971).
43. O'Connor v. City of Rockford, 3 Ill. App. 3d 548, 279 N.E.2d 356 (1972).
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that the law will remain in this situation until such time as the legis-
lature shall provide a more appropriate solution to resolving inter-
governmental conflicts on the local level.
In conclusion, it is obvious that the Illinois Constitution of 1970
has set in motion legal trends and political forces that will ultimately
remake the entire body of local governmental law in this state. At
this time we foresee these movements and trends only in a general
way. It will remain for the annual surveys of the future to docu-
ment the details of these trends as they unfold.
